

arms control and disarmament agreements with other nations. For the last 4½ years the United States has sought to negotiate a nuclear test ban treaty. At various times throughout these 4½ years, the United States has changed its requirements for monitoring and inspecting such a ban. Many of these changes have resulted from increased understanding of the problems involved and from improved techniques developed for their solution. Other changes have resulted from military and political reassessments of the advantages and disadvantages of a test ban treaty to U.S. interests.

This statement will discuss two basic questions which have been raised about the test ban negotiations:

1. Is an effective and comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty in the U.S. national interests?
2. What changes in our ability to detect and identify nuclear explosions have occurred which justify changes in our verification requirements, including the number of onsite inspections?

I. A TEST BAN TREATY IS IN OUR NATIONAL INTERESTS

1. Advantages

(a) Weapons development:

Without a treaty and with continued unlimited testing on both sides, there would be further increases by both in the efficiency of weapons at the higher yield end of the scale. Our advantage in small-weight, high-yield weapons would most probably diminish. Both sides would enhance their knowledge of weapons effects. In the field of tactical weapons, the Soviets would eventually be able to match our more diversified and numerous arsenal. Overall, the trend would be toward equality between the United States and the U.S.S.R.

With a treaty, improvements in yield-to-weight ratios would come more slowly through laboratory work alone. The U.S. advantage in smaller weapons would persist over a longer time. Some weapons effects phenomena would remain unsettled or undiscovered by both sides. The development of antimissile systems would be slowed down on both sides. Our tactical weapon superiority would persist longer. In general, our present nuclear advantages would last for a considerably longer period.

(b) Spread of nuclear weapons to other countries: It is in our interest to prevent or slow the rate of diffusion of nuclear weapons. The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 shows a strong national policy to this end. While a test ban as such would not alone prevent other nations from acquiring nuclear weapons, continued testing on both sides would certainly stimulate other nations to acquire them. The rate and motivation for diffusion would be dampened considerably by a test ban treaty.

(c) Establishment of an inspection system on Soviet soil: A test ban which includes provision for some on-site inspection in the Soviet Union has potential significance for progress in other areas of arms control and disarmament and for future relations between the United States and the U.S.S.R. It would give both sides experience with inspection and permit us to appraise their cooperation, and in the light of that appraisal, to estimate the cooperation which might be forthcoming in the verification of more significant agreements. It might serve also to "open" the Soviet Union to some extent and to help diminish the Soviets' fear that effective control is another name for espionage. It could lead to the development of a basis for confidence in other agreements.

(d) Elimination of fallout: A test ban treaty should lead to the elimination of whatever danger exists from fallout from United States and Soviet nuclear weapon tests.

2. Disadvantages

(a) Risk of secret preparations and surprise abrogation of the treaty: If preparations for testing were not maintained by the United States after entering into a test ban, it is possible that we would be in a position after a few years in which a surprise abrogation by the Soviets might leave us as much as 18 months behind in our readiness to test. However, in case of agreement, the Government will make it a matter of national policy to maintain readiness to test, and to provide funds necessary for this and for the incentive program necessary to keep competent scientific talent available. Under these circumstances, our scientists should retain the incentives to continue nuclear weapons research and our weapons laboratories should function effectively. This is not insurance against surprise abrogation but would minimize any possibility of a long Soviet headstart in preparations for testing.

(b) Risks resulting from possible cheating: Many important scientific principles involved in nuclear weapons can be studied with nuclear explosions of less than 3 kilotons, including certain of the principles involved in developing possible pure fusion weapons and in reducing weight-yield ratios. This figure is significant for explosions of this size and smaller may not always be detectable. None of the seismic systems proposed by the United States from 1959 on would be capable of detecting with any certainty many explosions of 3 kilotons or less if they occurred in alluvium, a common soil formation similar to gravel. Moreover, artificial decoupling (i.e., the so-called "big hole" technique), might permit considerably large yield explosions without detection.

However, for the weapons developments and knowledge of weapons effects which are of primary concern to us, and which might make a substantial change in the military balance in a way which would be unfavorable to us, clandestine, underground testing would be unsatisfactory. Moreover, the point of diminishing returns in improving weight-yield ratios is fast approaching. And pure fusion weapons would not be of great advantage to us because they would constitute primarily a cheaper substitute for the explosive component in our already large stockpile of nuclear weapons. Hence, any inhibitions on the development of these weapons would appear to be to our net advantage. There is therefore general agreement within the executive branch that a test ban adequately verified so as to provide reasonable assurance against evasion would be in the interest of the United States.

Furthermore, an evader testing in alluvium would probably have little assurance that the cavity produced by the explosion would not collapse, leading to a large visible surface crater which might itself be detected. Moreover, due to the variability in the size of the seismic signals which can occur from explosions of the same size, an evader could not be sure of evading even seismic detection at low yields by testing in alluvium.

"Big hole" decoupling is both time consuming and expensive. Preparation of a large cavity might itself be detected during the construction phase. Moreover, since this form of decoupling has never been tried on any practical scale so far as we know, a potential evader would again be unsure that he could escape detection. Finally, while single tests might sometimes escape detection by seismic means, a test series would be far more difficult to hide. Yet, little progress can ordinarily be made with individual, isolated tests.

3. Balance of risks

All these factors were considered at length by the President and his top advisers in July and August of last summer. Messrs. John

J. McCloy and Robert A. Lovett as ad hoc advisers joined the Committee of Principals which includes the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Chairmen of the Atomic Energy Commission and of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Special Assistants to the President on National Security Affairs and Science and Technology, and myself. This group was unanimous in concluding that the risks of secret evasion and of surprise abrogation were outweighed by the risks of continued unlimited testing on both sides.

II. CHANGES IN DETECTION CAPABILITY RESULTING IN CHANGES IN U.S. POSITION

Over the years there have been numerous reassessments of the technical problems involved in detecting underground nuclear explosions. These reassessments have resulted from actual observations of earth tremors over a period of years and from extended research along lines originally recommended by the Berkner Panel Report on Seismic Improvement in 1959. These reassessments have occasionally produced changes in the U.S. position. I will discuss here only those developments which have occurred since the United States submitted a complete nuclear test ban treaty on April 18, 1961, even though there were others before that which produced changes in our monitoring and inspection requirements.

The first of the significant reassessments was the establishment of a better capability for long-distance detection of earth tremors caused by nuclear explosions or earthquakes. This makes it possible to propose a simpler and more economical system for long-range detection, and to rely on stations operated by the United States for the detection of earth tremors in the Soviet Union. Since we would not place primary reliance on Soviet-manned stations to detect such tremors but only as auxiliary tools to gain knowledge about the special features of earthquakes in the Soviet Union, we need be much less concerned about the possibilities for cheating at these stations. Operation of its own system by the United States has the advantage that its size, efficiency and utilization are all under our direct control, and that a great reduction in cost is possible.

The second significant technical reassessment is that an earlier estimate of the number of tremors from earthquakes in the Soviet Union which might be confused with tremors from nuclear explosions has been shown by actual observation and research to be several times too large. Since there are fewer actual earthquakes which produce tremors similar to those of an explosion, the number of onsite inspections needed to identify the cause of any observed tremors is less.

The third significant reassessment is that our ability from a distance and without onsite inspection to ascertain that some earth tremors are caused by earthquakes and not explosions has been steadily improving. In a recent study of the annual earth tremors located in the Soviet Union by stations operated from a distance, over half gave indications of being earthquakes on the basis of such seismic criteria as first earth motion. Somewhat less than another third were found to be unlikely possibilities for nuclear tests based upon nonseismic criteria such as their general geographic location and the detailed characteristics of the area of the tremor's origin.

In 1958, when the test ban negotiations began and we knew less than we now know about earthquakes and nuclear explosions, the United States asked for as many on-site inspections as there were unidentified earth tremors above 5-kiloton yield. In 1960, we proposed 20 on-site inspections each year. In 1961, we proposed a sliding scale ranging from a high of 20 to a low of 12.

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Whereas due to the continuing inaction and indecision of the United States Government and the following offensive weapon "quarantine" of Cuba in October 1962, and commenting on the negotiations entered into between Khrushchev and the United States, mostly secret in nature, including the abandonment of on-site inspection of offensive weapons in Cuba, Khrushchev has enunciated and is implementing the "Khrushchev doctrine" as a replacement for the "Monroe Doctrine" as he restated the Communist aims in the Western Hemisphere at the recent Supreme Soviet when he stated: "Socialist Cuba exists. Cuba remains a beacon of Marxist-Leninist ideas in the Western Hemisphere. The impact of her revolutionary example will grow. The Government of the United States has given a pledge not to invade Cuba"; and

Whereas Castro, on January 16, 1963, announced his intention to use his externally supported massive military power to continue the enslavement of the Cuban people and to "bring the masses to battle" through revolution in Latin America; and

Whereas if the Monroe Doctrine is to be preserved it must be restated and fully enforced at this critical period when communism is openly and notoriously arming Cuba with massive modern weapons, tens of thousands of Russian troops, technicians and advisers, electronic missile jamming and tracking devices and "fishing" ports capable of accommodating Russian missiles, all of which constitutes a military capability of such proportions that it is offensive in nature and design; Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. That the United States is determined—

(a) to prevent by whatever means may be necessary, including the use of arms, the international Communist movement operating through the Marxist-Leninist regime in Cuba from enslaving the people of Cuba and threatening the security of the Western Hemisphere, and from extending, by force or the threat of force, its aggressive or subversive activities to any part of this hemisphere;

(b) to prevent in Cuba the creation or use of an externally supported military capability enslaving the freedom-loving people of Cuba and endangering the security of the United States; and

(c) to work with the Organization of American States and with freedom-loving Cubans to support the aspirations of the Cuban people for self-determination.

Sec. 2. That the Congress of the United States urges the President, in accordance with existing law, to take, and supports him in taking, jointly with other free nations or unilaterally, such political, diplomatic, economic, or military action as may be necessary to implement and enforce the Monroe Doctrine throughout this hemisphere and to continue to encourage adherence to the principles of self-determination and human freedom.

TEST BAN VIEWS OF NATIONAL STRATEGY COMMITTEE OF THE AMERICAN SECURITY COUNCIL

(Mr. HOSMER asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record.)

Mr. HOSMER. Mr. Speaker, as you are aware, the Republican conference committee on nuclear testing is receiving papers from various experts on the nuclear testing question. Mr. Frank J. Johnson, of the staff of the American Security Council, has submitted an anal-

ysis of the views of the Council's National Strategy Committee. Members of the National Strategy Committee are: Loyd Wright, Lt. Gen. Edward M. Almond, Adm. Ben Moreell, Dr. Robert Morris, Dr. Stefan T. Possony, Adm. Arthur W. Radford, Adm. Felix B. Stump, Dr. Edward Tell, and Adm. Chester C. Ward. The analysis does not purport to speak for individual members of the committee, but rather is Mr. Johnson's review of the committee's collective feelings based on numerous studies which it has conducted. The analysis is as follows:

AMERICAN SECURITY COUNCIL POSITION ON THE NUCLEAR TEST-BAN NEGOTIATIONS (By Frank J. Johnson)

It is now generally agreed that the U.S. decision to unilaterally end nuclear tests in 1958 jeopardized national security. Our test sites deteriorated and finally were deactivated. Our scientists went on to other pursuits. When the Soviet Union later resumed its testing, we were caught totally unprepared, and the Soviets went a long way toward closing the nuclear gap. This must never happen again.

There is little evidence to indicate that the Communists are interested in true disarmament; there is certainly no evidence to show any Communist support for the concept of controlled, verifiable disarmament. Nevertheless, the Soviet representative clamors for "general and complete disarmament" in the United Nations and at Geneva. Given the well-known nature of communism and the pattern of Communist activities since World War I, it is logical to assume that their probable aim in the field of disarmament is to support a specific, clear-cut political objective. Stated in simplest terms, it is to increase the power of the Soviet Union in relationship to that of the United States.

Within this general context we must examine Khrushchev's probable purpose in his latest nuclear test-ban proposal. If a treaty is signed, there are three possible dangers to United States security. These are: (1) that a test ban would be a first step toward the inhibition or crippling of the U.S. ability to use nuclear weapons, if need be, in defense of the West; (2) that, failing this, the Soviet could prepare to test, once again, in secrecy, thus stealing another technological march on the United States; and (3) that the terms of the treaty will allow the Soviet to cheat on underground testing without discovery.

As to the first point, it is obvious that Communists consider a cessation of nuclear testing as but the first step toward an increased campaign to outlaw nuclear weapons altogether. Khrushchev himself made this abundantly clear in June, 1958, before the test ban talks had even started. "After the termination of nuclear weapons tests," he said, "it would be possible to raise the question of the powers making a solemn undertaking not to use hydrogen and atomic weapons and henceforth to adopt a decision on the total prohibition of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons." The Soviet plan for general disarmament presented at Geneva last April proposed an immediate 100-percent cut in nuclear delivery vehicles. The Soviets know only too well that a complete cessation of tests will merely serve to shift the pressures of world opinion to the banning of all nuclear weapons and that such a prohibition would be tantamount to the unilateral disarmament of the West.

The abrupt end of the voluntary suspension of nuclear testing brought about by the Soviet in September 1961, illustrates the second danger. While the moratorium lasted, it looked fine. However, while the United States was observing the moratorium in

spirit as well as letter, the Soviet Union was carefully and secretly doing all the scientific research and preparation for further tests. When they were ready, the moratorium ended. The result was that the Soviet Union gained months of preparation and was able to make more than 40 tests of new weapons before we could get started. There is nothing in the current proposals to prevent a repetition of this. Certainly the fact that the suspension is formalized by a treaty would be no bar to Soviet duplicity. The record of Soviet treaty violations is sufficient proof of this.

With regard to the third danger—that the Soviet might successfully cheat on underground testing—much is currently made of the alleged Soviet "concession" in Khrushchev's willingness to permit up to three on-site inspections in the Soviet Union for all unidentified seismic events. This, however, is not new. It was offered by Soviet negotiators in Geneva in 1960, and rejected by the United States. Our position at that time was that 20 such inspections would be necessary in order to provide reasonable assurance that no clandestine underground testing of nuclear weapons is taking place.

In his letters of December 29, 1962, and January 7, 1963, Khrushchev has done no more than reiterate his earlier willingness to permit three on-site inspections, plus three automatic seismic stations (black boxes) within the U.S.S.R. The United States, on the other hand, has gradually reduced its demands for on-site inspections from 20 to 8-10, and now seems prepared to reduce this even further. The only concessions made since 1960 have therefore been made by the United States.

As a further concession to the Soviets, the United States has now unilaterally suspended its Nevada test shots while the current test-ban negotiations continue. Such a misplaced gesture can have no effect on the outcome of the discussions, but indicates the air of unreality which permeates Washington thinking on the whole subject of disarmament.

Since force or the threat of force is indispensable to the triumph of communism, we should begin to understand the simple truth that Russia will accept a disarmament agreement only if it will result in a net politico-military advantage to the Communists in the struggle for the world. The nuclear test ban fits this criterion. It has been a central feature of Communist "peace" propaganda for many years. It is a vital ingredient in the continuing Soviet effort to alter the military balance in their favor. Consequently, a nuclear test ban as currently contemplated would be inimical to the interests of the United States and the free world.

WILLIAM C. FOSTER'S VIEWS ON NUCLEAR TEST BAN

(Mr. HOSMER asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record.)

Mr. HOSMER. Mr. Speaker, the Republican conference committee on nuclear testing has asked several experts to comment on the subject of the nuclear test ban in order that the Congress and the American people can be better informed on this subject so vital to the national security. The following is the paper submitted to the committee by Mr. Foster:

WHY THE UNITED STATES CONTINUES NEGOTIATING FOR A NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY (By William C. Foster)

For the last 17 years, a major U.S. foreign policy objective has been to enhance our security through safeguarded and balanced

7.1 million capacity compared to a 6.8 million enrollment. State programs have achieved this positive balance and can continue to do so if tax sources are left available to the States.

State legislatures across the country appropriated \$1.8 billion in State tax funds for higher education in the 1962-63 period. That represents a gain of 24.5 percent over the 2 years. How can the administration claim that the States are refusing to meet the education obligation?

On the secondary and elementary school level we have, since the end of World War II, witnessed the greatest school building program ever conducted by this Nation, all without Federal grants. In the past decade alone more than 500,000 classrooms have been built. And, based on the sale of school bonds for the past several years, there is every reason to believe this high rate will continue.

Last year alone, 72,000 classrooms were built. That is the highest total ever in 1 year.

This increase in schoolroom construction is all the more dramatic in view of the fact that it has been accomplished in spite of this administration's lack of support and encouragement for local solutions.

Mr. Speaker, I submit that it is time for this administration to admit that the people do not want and certainly do not need massive direct Federal grants to education.

I submit that it is time for the Congress to note with pride the enterprise with which Americans are meeting the education problem on the local and State level.

I submit that it is time for this Congress to assist those Americans by releasing from Federal usurpation the tax base Americans need to continue this heartening school progress.

Americans have proved that they know how to manage their money.

Let us give them their money back.

(Mr. CRAMER asked and was given permission to extend his remarks in the body of the Record in two instances and to include extraneous matter.)

[Mr. CRAMER'S remarks will appear hereafter in the Appendix.]

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HOUSE JOINT RESOLUTION 227 EXPRESSING THE DETERMINATION OF THE UNITED STATES WITH RESPECT TO THE SITUATION IN CUBA, TO RESTATE AND IMPLEMENT THE MONROE DOCTRINE, TO ENCOURAGE ADHERENCE TO THE PRINCIPLES OF SELF-DETERMINATION AND HUMAN FREEDOM, AND CALL FOR COMPLETE INVESTIGATION BY CONGRESS

(Mr. CRAMER asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. CRAMER. Mr. Speaker, it is amply evident that the Communists are in fact implementing the Khrushchev doctrine as a replacement for the Monroe Doctrine in the Western Hemisphere—witness the continuing and alarming arms buildup in Cuba—the maintaining of tens of thousands of Russian military, advisory, and technical personnel in Cuba—the building of a number of so-called fishing ports with depths and dockage services capable of servicing and harboring Russian submarines and the installation of electronic counterequipment capable of jamming or tracking missiles launched from Cape Canaveral.

It is further evident that Castro is bent on using this massive military and espionage capability to keep the Cuban freedom-loving people in slavery; and, as late as January 16, bragged of his intention to incite the masses to battle in Latin America.

It is obvious, due to its inaction and indecision, that the U.S. Government is lacking in the determination, desire, or intent to rid this hemisphere of Castro and communism in Cuba and the threat that it poses to the United States as well as the Latin American countries.

With these facts indisputably established, I believe it is imperative that the Congress of the United States take action immediately because the situation is far more dangerous today than it was when the limited Cuban resolution was passed on September 26, 1962. It is obvious that the so-called quarantine against offensive weapons of October 1962, and the negotiations that have taken place since then, mostly secret in nature, have emboldened the Communists even to the extent that Khrushchev at the Supreme Soviet recently stated as Communist policy and intention:

Socialist Cuba exists. Cuba remains a beacon of Marxist-Leninist ideas in the Western Hemisphere. The impact of her revolutionary example will grow. The Government of the United States has given a pledge not to invade Cuba.

I have introduced a resolution today calling for restatement and full implementation of the Monroe Doctrine, a clearcut repudiation of the Khrushchev doctrine with which the Communists are trying to supplant the Monroe Doctrine.

I recall the efforts of the Republicans, myself included, on September 26, 1962, to amend the limited Cuban resolution as proposed by the administration to clearly restate the Monroe Doctrine and to make certain that it is stated as the policy of the United States to oppose the attempt on the part of European powers:

To extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety.

This means that the Monroe Doctrine applies to the arming and communizing of Cuba itself, as well as the threat of exporting that communism to other countries or the threatening of the United States with conveniently defined "defensive weapons."

My resolution brings into focus the clear and present danger the massive Communist military and espionage buildup in Cuba poses to the United

States, to Latin American nations, and to the objectives of self-determination and individual freedom. It calls upon the United States, bilaterally or unilaterally, to take whatever steps are necessary to rid the hemisphere of this threat.

I am asking for immediate consideration of this and other resolutions on this subject matter and, in the consideration of these, for the proper congressional committees to make a full study and thorough investigation into the Cuban situation—commitments and negotiations that have taken place, present military and espionage capability buildup, aid and assistance given Castro by Russia and Red China, the real purpose of the increase in merchant ship traffic, the construction of a powerful radio transmitter station in the eastern portion of Havana Province which allows the Soviet military command in Cuba to maintain direct communication with the Reds in Russia and China, the weekly nonstop Moscow to Havana TU-114, 220-passenger, turboprop flights, the twice-monthly service to Cuba of three large and substantial cargo carrying passenger liners, and the stepped-up nonmilitary support of Castro by the Communists.

Congress and the American people should be fully informed and our freedoms should be adequately protected, which can only be accomplished with complete disclosure of the facts and the full implementation of the Monroe Doctrine as the objective of the U.S. Government.

The full text of my resolution follows:

H.J. Res. 227

Joint resolution expressing the determination of the United States with respect to the situation in Cuba, to restate and implement the Monroe Doctrine, and to encourage adherence to the principles of self-determination and human freedom

Whereas, President James Monroe, announcing the Monroe Doctrine in 1823, declared that the United States would consider any attempt on the part of European powers "to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety"; and

Whereas in the Rio Treaty of 1947 the parties agreed that "an armed attack by any State against an American State shall be considered as an attack against all the American States, and, consequently, each one of the said contracting parties undertakes to assist in meeting the attack in the exercise of the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations"; and

Whereas the Foreign Ministers of the Organization of American States at Punta del Este in January 1962 declared: "The present Government of Cuba has identified itself with the principles of Marxist-Leninist ideology, has established a political, economic, and social system based on that doctrine, and accepts military assistance from extracontinental Communist powers, including even the threat of military intervention in America on the part of the Soviet Union"; and

Whereas the international Communist movement has increasingly extended into Cuba its political, economic, and military sphere of influence, despite the fact that such action is clearly in violation of the Monroe Doctrine and the principles of self-determination and human freedom; and

know the reason for this seeming weakening in the President's October 22 position. Fidel Castro remains the unfinished business of the hemisphere. The question is: Why?

TAX INCENTIVES TO PROMOTE EDUCATION

(Mr. HALL asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record.)

Mr. HALL. Mr. Speaker, I come before the House today to introduce a bill which sets forth a program that deals with education and with taxes.

Briefly, my bill consists of two major provisions: First tax relief for families with children in college, and, second, tax credit for homeowners for that portion of their real property tax which is used for the maintenance, operation, and construction of public elementary and secondary schools.

There have been in recent years many bills dealing with what we are told is the immediate need for Federal aid to education. In the bill I introduce today I seek not Federal aid to education, not the massive expenditure of Federal funds, which a nation in debt cannot afford, not Federal usurpation of local responsibility, and certainly not Federal control of education.

This bill deals with a different concept, the proper role of the Federal Government with respect to education at all levels, elementary, secondary, and college.

That proper role of our National Government must be the role of helping our people to help themselves without direct intervention or control of the Federal Government. The proper role must consider not statistical pipedreams, but the actual need which exists in the country today for expanding and augmenting educational facilities. By actual need I mean that need not already being met by the traditional local means.

My colleagues, that proper role is to use Federal law to place at the disposal of the people and of the local districts and of the States the financial means to handle the school needs that exist or may arise.

There is nothing strange about this proper role of the Federal Government. It simply is the role of letting the people decide, in their own communities where that decision best can be made, just what their educational system needs are. The decision having been made the proper role of the Federal Government is to equip the people to handle their needs through their local school boards, without direction and control from the Washington bureaucracy.

Providing an education for their children traditionally is the concern and the responsibility of the American family, not of the Federal Government. The vast accumulation of private savings for use in educating children bears witness that Americans believe in this principle.

Besides, most of us here can recall that back in the 1950's many educators were direly predicting a shortage of 400,000 classrooms by 1960. Yet when 1960 rolled

around that shortage, by the educators' own best statistics, was less than 40,000, and the local communities under the leadership of local boards of education were building rapidly to eliminate even that small gap.

Now, let us first consider the problems of college education:

A Federal program to aid our children in attaining a college education should be directed at helping parents do the job. It should avoid outright Federal grants with an accompanying expansion of Federal bureaucracy, Federal supervision and Federal control.

I, therefore, propose a program of tax relief for families with children in college. Such families will be, under my bill, given a substantial increase in Federal income tax deductions for each dependent attending college or junior college.

My bill as it concerns college education contains these major provisions:

First. The taxpayer will be granted an additional deduction from his taxable income for the expenses incurred by him, his spouse, or his dependents, while any of these is attending a college or junior college.

Second. Expenses covered will include tuition and fees charged by the college, books, supplies, equipment and room and board. The amount the taxpayer may deduct would be the actual amount of college expenses, not to exceed \$2,000 for each dependent attending college.

Third. The deduction is available to a taxpayer whose dependent is attending a college, university, junior college, or other institution of higher learning such as medical school, dental school, law school, or any other graduate school.

Let us now turn to the problem of precollege education:

The measure which I propose here today will, if adopted or if incorporated in an overall tax revision, make all the alternative plans for Federal aid to education now under serious consideration irrelevant and unnecessary.

The plan is simple, elemental, and constitutional.

My bill will provide the means for solving current problems and future problems which actually exist in the fields of elementary and secondary education. The basic problem is financial.

If State and local governments in some parts of the Nation are unable to keep pace with their school needs, and recent statistics point out that most local school districts are holding their own rather nicely even in spite of national and State "prevailing wage" laws, it is because Federal taxing power has pre-empted State and local sources of revenue.

Hence, the proper solution to this problem is for the Federal Government to restore to local authorities a portion of the tax resources previously taken away.

This is precisely what my measure will do. Here are the major provisions:

First. The taxpayer would continue to deduct the amount of his real property tax from his gross taxable income. After he determines what his tax would be, he then credits against his final tax that

amount of his real property tax which is used for the maintenance, operation, and construction of public elementary and secondary schools.

Second. The tax credit would be the amount actually paid by the taxpayer, not to exceed \$100.

Third. The taxpayer who takes a standard or short-form deduction also would benefit since the credit is taken against the final tax after all exemptions and deductions have been made.

Education experts now estimate that the average annual school tax payment by the some 40 million American property owners is about \$200 each. Allowing for the standard income tax percentage deduction, and adding the up to \$100 tax credit for property owners, it is estimated that between \$3½ billion and \$4 billion would be made available to local governments as an increased tax base.

Experts tell me that amount, if the local districts choose to use it, would be enough to end all financial problems of American elementary and secondary schools.

It should be clearly understood that this tax credit would go to every American property owner who pays school taxes, regardless of the taxpayer's race, religion or economic status.

There are many concrete advantages to this approach to helping elementary and secondary schools. Here are a few of those advantages:

The tax benefits provided would go directly to some 40 million taxpayers.

There would be no danger of Federal control.

There would be no expanding Federal bureaucracy.

Every dollar of tax money thus made available would buy a full dollar's worth of school aid if the local community decided to expand expenditures for education. And the local community knows its needs better than any Washington bureaucrat can.

In closing, Mr. Speaker, let me briefly place in proper perspective the current situation regarding the apparent needs of America's schools.

During the past 2 years we have seen dozens of desperate attempts by the administration to enact some form of direct Federal financial aid to education on a compulsory basis. None of these attempts has succeeded.

I am convinced that the principal reason the administration has been unsuccessful with its compulsory aid plan is the action of the citizens of this Nation, who have year after year taxed themselves in ever increasing amounts to maintain the finest system of public education in the world.

Our people are aware that they are now doing and have been doing for years that which the administration now tells them can only be done by Federal grants-in-aid. Local and State hard work, perseverance and initiative have all but wiped out inadequacies in classroom space and in teachers' salaries.

It is now estimated that the Nation's colleges will have an enrollment capacity of some 5.4 million students in 1965 as compared to expected enrollment of 5.2 million. By 1970 the figures will be some

but he will, if attacked, produce "massive retaliation."

The fact is that Mr. Khrushchev had long ago opted for nuclear peace with the United States of America. Since Cuba, he knows that the United States has also opted for nuclear peace with Soviet Russia. There is today an undeclared nuclear peace pact between the U.S.S.R. and the United States for the simple reason that the initiation of nuclear war is not to the best interests of either.

The U.S. press, following the President's lead, is currently taking a benign view of Mr. Khrushchev's new nuclear posture. Besides, it feels so good since he stopped poking his Cuban missiles into our solar plexus. The vials of their wrath have been saved up for Gen. Charles de Gaulle, who has had the gall to say, since Cuba, that he thinks France would now certainly be more safe under its own nuclear umbrella than under America's.

DE GAULLE BACKED UNITED STATES

Because of this, General de Gaulle's "image" is being rapidly worked over, with the enthusiastic help of the American left, to resemble a half-mad Napoleon, or an Abominable No-man. It is even being suggested that General de Gaulle wishes France to become a nuclear power in order to make a deal over Germany with Russia. This is to suggest that France desires to have Russia on her own borders, instead of Germany's, which is, of course, preposterous. If either France or Germany fails to the Reds, all Europe falls with them, and every European knows it.

It is interesting to inquire what General de Gaulle was doing the first tense hours of the U.S. naval blockade, while Soviet missiles were being leveled by Russian troops on American cities. Was he threatening to pull out of the grand alliance if the United States invaded Cuba? Was he begging us to throw the whole business into the U.N.? Was he reminding us that the French feel that the United States let France down in Indochina, Algeria, and Suez, so France couldn't be expected to sympathize with our troubles about Cuba? Was he advising President Kennedy to make a deal with Khrushchev about Cuba fast, because if the United States invaded Cuba Khrushchev might retaliate by striking at West Berlin and thus trigger world war III?

He was not. The general was offering to fight by the side of the United States if we felt our vital interests required us to kick Castro and Khrushchev both out of Cuba. And by this very fact he was pledging France to take all the nuclear risks we felt we might be incurring.

The President, in his recent press conference, acknowledged that General de Gaulle "responded when we were in difficulty in Cuba." "But," he added, with some extraordinarily peculiar logic of his own, "I would hope that our confidence in him would be matched by his confidence in us."

FRANCE GAINS STRENGTH

This whole sentence must have been a typographical error.

The President had just admitted a period back, that when we were in difficulties President de Gaulle had shown the ultimate in confidence by his willingness to risk nuclear war if risk there was, by the side of America.

What the President really meant to say, of course, was that whereas President de Gaulle had shown confidence in us at the time of the naval blockade, the final U.S. political capitulation to Khrushchev and Castro had diminished that confidence, and that the President hoped that somehow it could be restored.

The hope is an idle one. The fault is by no means entirely the President's. France has grown economically strong enough to stand on her own legs. It would follow naturally, in any case, that she should desire

sooner or later to stand on her own legs militarily. The significance of the two Kennedy backdowns over Cuba is that what was a desire now seems, or at least to General de Gaulle, to be an urgent necessity for France's own survival.

The character of the U.S. nuclear commitment made in 1946 changed in the fifties when Russia became itself a nuclear power. Today, as in 1946, that commitment is to launch a nuclear attack on Soviet Russia if she moves against Germany. But in 1963 the same commitment means a willingness to destroy the United States for the sake of Europe. When the matter is put in this blunt fashion, how many Americans are for it?

Khrushchev took the full measure of President Kennedy and U.S. public opinion in the Cuban crisis. So did Charles de Gaulle. His conclusion: If the war chips should ever go down in Europe, the United States will not initiate nuclear war on Russia until Russia wages nuclear war on America, and vice versa. The effect of this undeclared nuclear pact is to subtract both U.S. and U.S.S.R. nuclear forces from the European military equation.

BORROWS KENNEDY BOOK

Europe is today, without its own nuclear force, a "limited war" area. Consequently the outcome of any European conflict would then be decided by Russia's 125 divisions and NATO's 23, or a negotiation. Militarily, Europe is Germany and France. Their choice today is as plain as the nose on General de Gaulle's face. It is to get their own nuclear umbrella, or to trust the United States, if they are attacked by Russian conventional weapons, to launch her missiles at Russia, knowing that she would get Russia's 100-ton megaton bombs right back.

General de Gaulle has made the only choice a patriotic Frenchman could possibly make. Like the rational Frenchman he is, he chooses to build up his own nuclear establishment. He knows that the day U.S. troops are pulled out of Germany, France will be unable to defend itself without its own nuclear force.

In his youth, President Kennedy wrote a book called "While England Slept." It described how England, in 1939, was caught militarily napping by the Germans, and its very sound thesis was that no nation can afford to wait until it is attacked to prepare its own defenses, and that above all, it cannot rely on the military or economic strength, even of its allies, to save it from destruction.

Charles de Gaulle has paid the author of "While England Slept" the compliment of taking his advice. He does not intend to be caught napping, if at some future date the United States, in order to prevent a world holocaust, and its own destruction, yanks its nuclear umbrella away from Europe.

It is hard to see what is Napoleonic about a Frenchman's desire to protect France, or why the desire to remove France from the category of a "limited war" area should be considered a folie de grandeur. What is much more a folie de grandeur is the desire of the United States to keep Europe a U.S. nuclear colonial area and to keep Great Britain, France, and Germany forever in the U.S. nuclear nursery.

PRESIDENT CONTRADICTS HIMSELF AGAIN

(Mr. HALL asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. HALL. Mr. Speaker, I did not suspect when I addressed the House at our last session that there would be today yet another chapter to be presented

in the tale of "Jack in Wonderland." But there is, and it concerns the food stamp program of the Department of Agriculture.

This is an episode that would be appreciated by Tweedledum and Tweedledee. Indeed, the President sounds like those fantasy twins when he talks to Congress and the Nation.

I point out that in his budget message the President told us that the food stamp program should be continued in fiscal 1964 "at the same level as in 1963." And yet, when we last gathered in this Chamber, the same President told us that the food stamp program should be "progressively expanded."

It appears that the President's right hand does not know, or does not care, what the left hand is doing. I have written the President and asked him to explain this bit of new frontiersmanship to me.

His budget message contradicts his farm message and none of his secondary messages has agreed with the spirit of his state of the Union address.

All of his contradictions have been in the direction of increased Federal expenditures and added Federal control. He leaves the Congress and the American taxpayer no reason to believe his figure of a \$99 billion budget with a \$12 billion debt increase. Will he come here tomorrow and tell us he really means a \$125 billion budget and a \$40 billion debt hike?

This House knows well that I have been concerned also about the administration of the food stamp plan.

I pointed out to the House last year that the pilot program of the food stamp plan was extended to 26 congressional districts, 25 of them represented by Democrats. Democratic districts which do not fall into the category of depressed areas, one of the alleged guidelines for the program, were selected for participation while areas of substantial and persistent unemployment represented by Republicans were ignored, including the most depressed area in the Nation at Johnstown, Pa.

I also have asked the President to inform me of the steps he has taken to reform this administrative mess which operates as a slush fund for the Democrat Party.

But I still cannot get over the novelty of an administration that thinks it can expand something and at the same time maintain it at the same level. I suspect that the next thing we hear about will be the expansion of the food stamp plan to include the Mad Hatter's tea party.

INTERSTATE HIGHWAY REIMBURSEMENT

(Mr. RIEHLMAN asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute, and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. RIEHLMAN. Mr. Speaker, for a number of years I have battled along side many of my colleagues from New York for the principle of reimbursement under the interstate highway program. Our efforts have yet to be crowned with success but I am confident that, our

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cause being eminently just and our will unflagging, reimbursement will one day become a reality.

The people of New York State have constructed, at their own expense, 490 miles of superhighway that was included in the Interstate System. They exercised initiative and foresight in proceeding to build this mileage for inclusion in the Interstate System at a time when there was a recognized need for such a system but no money forthcoming from the Federal Government to build it. New York was not alone. Many other States followed this same course and have a similar interest in equitable reimbursement.

The people of New York, and of other States entitled to reimbursement, should not be required to bear the expense of this interstate construction from their own pockets when it is clearly a Federal responsibility to pay 90 percent of the cost of every mile along the Interstate System. I ask why New York taxpayers should have to bear the expense of constructing a considerable portion of their own interstate mileage without help from the highway trust fund and at the same time have their gasoline and other highway-user taxes go for construction of interstate mileage all across the country.

As a practical matter New York State has lost nearly half of its interstate allocation and the 90 to 10 Federal-State cost sharing ratio has been almost completely reversed for the interstate mileage presently existing in New York. There is no reason why such a penalty should be placed on initiative and progress.

The Congress indicated in the 1956 act that it would consider at some future time whether or not the States should be reimbursed for previously constructed toll and free portions of interstate routes. Many of you will recall that the House Public Works Committee and the House itself adopted language in 1956 declaring it to be the definite intent of the Congress that the States should be reimbursed for this construction. This was not acceptable to the Senate and the final version of the 1956 act merely indicated a willingness to look into the matter at some future date.

Mr. Speaker, I am introducing legislation today declaring it to be the intent and policy of Congress to equitably reimburse the States for these costs. It will place the Congress on record as endorsing the principle of reimbursement. It specifies that the Congress will establish the time, method, amount, conditions, and financing of the reimbursement so that it will be made as soon as possible after substantial completion of construction of the Interstate System. As you know, the target date for completion is now 1972.

I do not believe this is too much to ask. It places no additional burden on the interstate program at present. It merely declares the definite intent of Congress to pursue a course that is just and fair at a reasonably certain future date, consistent with existing plans for completion of the interstate network.

Because of some favorable expressions of interest on the part of several mem-

bers of the Public Works Committee during debate on the Federal Aid Highway Act of 1962, I am hopeful that that committee will give the matter of equitable reimbursement the serious attention it deserves during the 88th Congress.

DIXIE PROJECT, WASHINGTON COUNTY, UTAH

(Mr. BURTON asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record.)

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Speaker, upon coming to Washington, I promised the people of my congressional district that the first piece of legislation that I sponsored would be for the construction, operation, and maintenance of the Dixie project in Washington County, Utah. I have felt for some time that this project is of such significance and importance that it was deserving of this priority.

Lest the project's name—Dixie—arouse the curiosity of gentlemen from below the Mason-Dixon line, let me say that this southwestern portion of Utah has a salubrious climate and the Mormon pioneers actually grew cotton there in the early years of our State's history. The St. George Chamber of Commerce—St. George being the county seat—boasts with considerable justification that this is "where the summer sun spends the winter."

The primary purpose of the Dixie project is to provide water to land not now under irrigation; supplemental water to other land, and water for domestic purposes. There are many other benefits to be derived from this project, such as flood and drought control, drainage of land with an excessive collection of surplus water, furnishing electrical energy, fisheries, and wildlife benefits, together with unlimited recreational opportunities. When completed this project will literally make the desert blossom as the rose in Washington County.

These many benefits are not simply limited to the State of Utah and the people of that State. The entire Nation will receive many direct and indirect advantage from this project.

The project has engineering feasibility, the cost benefit ratio is better than 2 to 1, and the reimbursable costs can be repaid to the Federal Government within the 65th project year, with interest.

I am proud today to announce to the House that I have introduced a bill authorizing the Dixie project. It is my sincere wish that it will be this Congress that demonstrates its wisdom, as well as its faith in the future of our great western country, by authorizing the Dixie project.

COMMUNIST MILITARY THREAT

(Mr. SELDEN asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record.)

Mr. SELDEN. Mr. Speaker, when a little over 3 months ago President Kennedy drew the line on Soviet encroachment in our hemisphere, his action was hailed as a historic turning point in the cold war. America's friends throughout the world were heartened by our

firm resolve at a time of supreme crisis. Our own people gained new confidence in the course of our Nation and the future of freedom everywhere.

The cold winds of the new year have had a sobering effect, however. Evidence mounts that the Communist military threat to the hemisphere, far from being eliminated, is being bolstered. Last week, Secretary Rusk himself expressed concern over the continued encampment of Soviet military personnel in Cuba.

These reports have a familiar and ominous ring. The American people, who stood solidly behind the President in his hour of decision last October, can only be confused and increasingly alarmed at more recent Cuban developments.

In October, our people recognized that the risk was great, but they had faith in the President's assessment that the stakes involved were vital to our security. Now a little more than 3 months later, they may well ask why this issue of Soviet military intervention in the Western Hemisphere was not conclusively settled.

In short, why are we still menaced by a Soviet military establishment in Cuba?

Was the President's October requirement for on-site inspection of Soviet Cuban missile installations ever met? No. Instead we are relying on evidence supplied by constant aerial surveillance, not to mention Nikita Khrushchev's word, that so-called offensive missiles have been removed.

But in a nuclear age, major risks should not be taken for minor stakes. In October this Nation faced up to the ultimate risk. Surely, we did not risk war only to gain the right of aerial surveillance over Castro's Cuba. Surveillance, after all, is no substitute for policy in meeting the threat of a military force 90 miles from our shores.

Nor can the American people find comfort in the repeated assurances that Soviet military buildup reports from Cuba are unfounded. These denials also have an ominously familiar ring, as do reassurances that no offensive weapons are being added to Castro's island arsenal.

But the continuing threat to our hemisphere finds its roots not in the type or degree of weaponry furnished the Castro regime by its Soviet masters. The threat lies in the very existence of a Soviet island base in the heart of the Americas. No amount of aerial surveillance can protect our hemispheric and national security against the subversive threat posed by this alien force. Until we face up to this threat, once and for all, the energy and resources of this Nation will be further drained by the continuing crisis in Cuba.

For the Cuban crisis did not end in 1962. It continues as a result of our apparent failure to finish the job we boldly undertook. And the disquieting but persistent thought lingers that although we had seized the initiative in 1962, in 1963 we are again allowing it to slip from our grasp.

Considering the stakes involved, sufficient to risk a nuclear war only 3 months ago, the American people have a right to